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DHARMA IN PRACTICE: ACARA AND AUTHORITY IN
MEDIEVAL DHARMAŚASTRA
That dharma in the Dharmaśastra was derived in a historical sense
not from the Vedic literature but from ‘custom’ has long been ac-
cepted.1 In the clearest exposition of this thesis, Lariviere writes, ‘‘the
whole of the dharma corpus can be viewed as a record of custom’’
(1997: 98, also included in the present volume).2 An important dis-
tinction must be preserved here between dharma and Dharmaśastra,
for the former is a concept and an idea, while the latter is a series of
textual reflections on that concept. It is Dharmaśastra that derives its
substance primarily from what Lariviere and others call ‘custom.’ For
dharma, by contrast, ‘custom’ is only one of its sources. ‘Custom’ is
an ambiguous translation for the Sanskrit term acara, one of the
three principal sources of dharma, along with śruti and smr: ti, i.e. the
Vedas and Dharmaśastra texts themselves.
The uncertainty about the denotation of ‘custom’ stems from a
vacillation between custom as norm and custom as behavior (see, e.g.,
Lariviere, 1997: 104; Wezler, 1999: 84–88)3 and from a lack of critical
reflection on the possible differences between custom and customary
law. Both Lariviere and Wezler presuppose the nature of custom
without due reflection on the ambiguities of the term. The purpose of
this paper is to extend their arguments by examining the nature of
acara itself and its relation to the authority of dharma.
The ambiguity of custom in English is deeply embedded in Anglo-
American jurisprudence in which custom, also called the Common
Law, has, from the times of Blackstone and his predecessors, been
considered the truly great source of law’s authority, in contradis-
tinction to the modern legislations of parliaments.4 From legal circles
‘custom’ entered colonial discussions of social, religious, and legal
problems engendered in the encounter between Britain and its new
colonies, especially India (Vollenhoven, 1927; Jain, 1963; Bhattach-
arya, 1996; Chakravarty-Kaul, 1996: 187–198). Social anthropolo-
gists are the latest group to continue to expand, evolve, and criticize
the idea of ‘custom,’ again as part of a process of cultural and
Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 813–830, 2004.
 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
intellectual encounter (Moore, 1978, 1986; Renteln and Dundes,
1994). Over the last 50 years or so, however, an impressive literature
has accumulated on the historical and linguistic problems involved in
using the term ‘custom’ in comparative legal and religious studies.5
Geertz provides a summary criticism, ‘‘The mischief done by the
word ‘custom’ in anthropology, where it reduced thought to habit, is
perhaps only exceeded by that which it has done in legal history,
where it reduced thought to practice’’ (1983: 208). It is precisely this
extrication of thought and agency from the understanding of acara
that leads me to question the suitability of ‘custom’ as a transparent
English equivalent. If the Sanskrit term acara is to be related to the
concept of dharma, to the point of being the very foundation of
dharma in the Dharmaśastra (Wezler, 1999), then we must be clear
about what is meant by calling acara ‘custom.’
In this essay, I will contend that acara refers to norms or standards
consciously and deliberately established by the elites of a given
group.6 Both as one of the three traditional divisions of Dharmaśa-
stra (vyavahara and prayaścitta being the other two) and as a generic
term for local and regional laws (Davis, 1999: 191ff.), acara refers to
norms, expressed in the form of rules. As Ganganatha Jha writes in
his exposition of the Mmam: sa understanding of the relationship of
acara and dharma, ‘‘we are to accept as Dharma only those actions of
good men which they do as Dharma; that is to say, any and every act
done by good men is not to be regarded as Dharma; when they do an
act, thinking it to be Dharma, then alone is that act to be regarded as
Dharma’’ (Jha, 1916: 68).7 In other words, there is an agentive pro-
cess, typically in the form of consensus or legislation, whereby a
certain behavior is accorded the status of acara and thereby becomes
a norm, a rule, a law. Acara has attached to it a sense of behaving
according to a certain set of well-known standards (cf. Wezler, 1999:
84). There may be many behaviors common to a particular group or
region, but only when such a behavior has been authorized somehow
can it be called acara, a standard or law. Medieval Dharmaśastra
commentaries are full of glosses and synonyms for acara that indicate
both its nature as a norm and its conceptualization as practical and
practiced dharma.
Acara, therefore, is dharma in practice, the practical, ‘real’ life of
dharma that acts as a normative precedent for future action,8 even
though in practice it may sometimes differ from place to place and
time to time.9 If dharma’s authority rests primarily on three sources,
then it makes sense to examine the relationship of these sources to
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each other and to dharma itself. Elaborating on the medieval Dhar-
maśastra presentations of the sources of dharma, I would argue that
in general the authority of dharma derives both: (1) historically –
from the currency and political significance of acara and (2) aca-
demically or theologically – from the ideologically powerful con-
nection of acara with śruti and smr

ti. The first source of authority
operates both within and outside of the theological and jurispru-
dential discourses of Dharmaśastra, i.e. in the realm of praxis as well,
while the second is restricted primarily to this academic branch of
learning. However, to the extent that experts in Dharmaśastra,
mostly or exclusively Brahmins, had political and cultural influence,
the ideological connection of acara with Vedic tradition shaped and
informed the historical importance of acara as dharma in practice. On
the whole, I am concerned here primarily with the theological con-
nections of acara and dharma, although I believe the historical con-
nections impinge on the theology and vice-versa. This essay will,
therefore, attempt to illuminate the authority of dharma as presented
in medieval Dharmaśastra texts with particular attention to acara as
the least studied of the three classic sources.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PERSON IN DHARMAŚASTRA AND MIMAM: SA
The first step in understanding the authority of dharma in the religio-
legal discourses of medieval Dharmaśastra takes off from the fact
that the most important school for the exegesis of both the Vedas and
Dharmaśastra, the Purva-Mmam: sa,
10 recognized one of the princi-
pal sources of knowledge and authority in matters relating to dharma
to be human beings who know the Veda (vedavid). To be clear, the
Vedas as scripture are the starting point for all Mmam: sa, but it is
also clear from the tradition as a whole that the Vedas have power
and authority only insofar as it is known, understood, and followed
by human beings. Part of this grounding of authority in human
beings relates to dharma’s foundation in reason, as well as on the
Veda. Halbfass elaborates:
Essentially, dharma is that which can only be learned from the Veda and justified
through the Veda; there are no other means for knowing it, and no other sources for
legitimizing it: to be sure, this ‘rooting in the Veda’ (vedamulatva) should itself be
secured by reason and argumentation (yukti, nyaya). The dharma is vedamula; yet the
insight that this is so is considered as nyayamula, as being based upon reason. (1988:
325–326, cf. Medhatithi on Manu 2.6 in Jha, 1999: V.1: 58)
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The medieval Sarasvatıvilasa is somewhat more explicit when it
makes nyaya (reason, logic, common sense, etc.) into a kind of nat-
ural supplement to the Veda ‘‘vidheyasya darśanasya katha-
mam: śapurakatvena praman: akot: inives: at [because it enters into the
category of authority (praman: a) by supplying (completing) the ‘how-
portion’ in regard to the performance of what is enjoined]’’ (Shama
Shastry, 1927: 13).11 Dharma’s basis in nyaya begins to shift the locus
of authority away from texts to the people who know the texts and
their accompanying ritual and legal traditions.
Medieval Mmam: sa texts corroborate the idea that authority also
rests in the human person who knows the Vedic texts and traditions.
The point is clearly made in commentaries to the 3rd section of the
1st chapter of the Purva-Mımam: sa Sutras (PMS) of Jaimini. The first
sutra establishes the position of the purvapaks:a, i.e. the interlocutor
or straw man, against which the author establishes his opinion
through syllogisms. This wrong opinion reads: ‘‘dharmasya śab-
damulatvad aśabdam anapeks:am: syat [Because the basis of dharma is
the Veda, that which is not part of the Veda should be considered
unrequired (as dharma)]’’ (PMS 1.3.1, see Jha, 1916: 55). The sid-
dhanta, or established teaching, of Jaimini, however, states: ‘‘api va
kartr

samanyat praman: am anumanam: syat [On the contrary, the pre-
sumption (of a Vedic text) should be the proof (of the authority of
smr: ti and acara) because the agents are identical]’’ (PMS 1.3.2, see
Jha, 1916: 56). In this case, the purvapaks:a suggests that human
beings are only obliged to do things that are explicitly stated in the
Vedas; in everything else, they can do as they please. However, Jai-
mini, in the voice of the siddhanta, refutes this claim. Jha sums up the
medieval commentarial interpretations of the sutra as follows:
Because the agents or persons who compiled the Smr: tis are the same that performed
actions laid down in the Veda; that is to say, we know that during their lives, Manu,
Yajñavalkya and other writers on Smr: ti, acted fully in accordance with the injunc-
tions laid down in the Veda; and for persons who were such strict followers of the
Veda in conduct, it is not possible that they should have made assertions except in
accordance with direct Vedic injunctions known to them; therefore, we conclude that
the Smr: ti is authoritative (Jha, 1916: 57).
This argument opened the conceptual floodgates for the Mmam: sa
tradition because it was extended also to the conventional standards
and practices (acara) of these same ‘‘agents’’ (kartr: ) who followed the
Vedas.12 Such a view allowed medieval Dharmaśastra commentators
such as Medhatithi to incorporate acara under the same heading,
and, therefore, the same status, as smr

ti itself.13
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Another aspect of the Mmam: saka argument here merits a slight
elaboration. The Mmam: sakas acknowledge that the authority of
Dharmaśastra texts (smr: ti) and local laws (acara) derives not directly
from the extant Vedas, the contents of which overlap very little with
Dharmaśastra texts and local laws, but indirectly from people who
respect and know the Vedas. Moreover, and here the argument
stretches somewhat, the Mmam: sakas developed the doctrine that in
a case where a rule of smr: ti or acara cannot be derived from a Vedic
text, we should infer or presume (anumana) the existence of a lost
Vedic text to which the accepted rule of smr: ti or acara corresponds.
14
The key point here is not the doubtful historical validity of this ‘lost
Veda’ doctrine, but the hermeneutical gymnastics performed by the
Mmam: sakas to permit or recognize, in the first place, the authority
of humanly constructed norms and to connect that authority, in the
second place, with the authority of the Veda.
With this recognition of the authority of certain human pro-
nouncements about religious and legal life, we return to the argument
described earlier in which Lariviere, Wezler, and others have asserted
that Dharmaśastra’s real origins lie in ‘custom,’ i.e. acara. Although
the Mmam: sakas would likely not characterize Dharmaśastra’s ori-
gins in this way, it seems possible to read Mmam: sa as permitting
such a view provided that what we might call ‘the lost Veda corollary’
is also understood as part of the characterization, an important
corollary in that it allows the Mmam: sakas to claim that all sources
of dharma are ultimately based on the Vedas, whether extant or ‘lost.’
As a result, one way of extending the historical thesis of Lariviere and
Wezler is to suggest that even Hindu theology accords considerable
importance and authority to standards and observances proclaimed
and promulgated by humans. The authority of the person provides
Dharmaśastra with an apparatus of change and adaptability, one
that can meet the challenges of historical developments while pre-
serving an orthodox theological view of the ‘roots’ of dharma as
uniformly Vedic.
THE PRODUCTIVE TAUTOLOGY OF DHARMA AND ACARA
One striking aspect of the authority of dharma in medieval Dhar-
maśastra (one that characterizes many earlier and later conceptions
as well) is its tautological nature. The tautology works like this:
dharma is constituted and promulgated by those who already possess
authority, but those authorities must be people who follow and know
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dharma. This sociologically constructed tautology with the śis: t:as, the
educated elites, as the living focal point was both hermeneutically and
socially efficacious in classical and medieval India. Hermeneutically,
the tautology provided theological justification for a diversity of
injunctions, rules, and laws while still according importance to
dharma by permitting convention to define it only partially. Socially,
the tautology allowed the authority for dharma to rest with the
leaders of a community who determined the acara for their group.
Moreover, it provides us with a more plausible way to understand
what Indians meant by acara and similar words in legal and religious
contexts.
An interesting instance of this tautology at work in medieval
Dharmaśastra concerns the so-called ‘bad customs’ (duracara) or
‘special customs’ (anacara, lit. ‘not-customs’) of particular groups or
regions. The relationship of dharma to these deviant standards of
conduct – deviant, at least, from an outsider’s perspective – says a
great deal about the importance of acara in a general way to the
substantive content of dharma in practice.
A tension between pan-Indian and regional standards of conduct
acutely appears in Dharmaśastra texts. Scholars have sometimes
characterized the conflict as being between a transcendent dharma, on
the one hand, and ‘customary’ rules, such as acara, deśacara, kulacara,
etc.(not to mention the synonymous, and on this view rather para-
doxical terms deśadharma, kuladharma, etc.) on the other hand (e.g.
Lingat, 1973: 176ff.). I think this characterization creates a dichotomy
where there should be a continuity. Pitting dharma and acara against
each other fails to account for the connections between the two de-
scribed in dharma texts. A look at anacara in a late medieval Dhar-
maśastra text known as theLaghudharmaprakaśika (LDhP, Tamburan
1906) helps us see the connections of dharma and acara. The date of the
LDhP, also called Śa _nkarasmr

ti, is unknown but is probably no earlier
than the 16th centuryAD. Its provenance, however, is certain –Kerala.
In fact, the text calls itself the rules for the people of Kerala
(keral

avasi).15 The LDhP is one of at least three texts which records the
64 anacaras of Kerala and Kerala Brahmins (see Parpola, 2001).
Whereas anacara would usually refer to standards of behavior that
deviate from the norm, in the LDhP, it refers to a set of standards for
religious, political, moral, and legal behavior which were intended to
be normative only for Kerala people, especially Kerala Brahmins, to
whom most of the rules apply. In other words, despite its negative
prefix, anacara is a positive label for prescribed norms, not prohibited
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ones. The an- here is restrictive, not prohibitive, at least from the
point of view of those who accept these rules. I have not seen anacara
used in this way anywhere else, although Derrett (1977: 55) has made
a cryptic reference to what he calls the ‘marginal anacara literature’
and to a text called Anacaranirn: aya, which I have not been able to
locate.
More relevant, however, is Wezler’s discussion (1985) of duracara
in the Gırvan: apadamañjarı and Gırvan: ava _nmañjarı from Bengal.
16
Both of these texts use duracara to refer to accepted norms that were
restricted to a particular region. So, we are told that Brahmins in
Andhra ride horses, Brahmins in Karnataka eat without bathing first,
and that women in the Dravida and Kerala regions do not cover their
breasts. The list includes several standard regional norms that were
mentioned as early as Baudhayanadharmasutra 1.2.1-6 (Olivelle, 1999:
133) as well as others. The point here is that this label duracara for
certain regionally sanctioned practices comes from outside of the
region where they are authoritative, i.e. not from the perspective of
those who accept the restricted standards. From an internal or in-
sider’s point of view, what is duracara to an outsider means positive
prescriptions dictating authoritatively sanctioned behavior in many
areas of life.
The interesting fact about anacara and the Kerala case, as opposed
now to duracara, is that the insiders themselves are calling their
standards anacara, specifically recognizing that they deviated from
standards elsewhere. Such a recognition of separateness reveals a
consciousness of Kerala as a separate cultural entity which deviates in
certain ways from pan-Indian norms, here implicitly deemed acara,
not dharma. Moreover, nowhere in these discussions of duracara and
anacara are these terms said to be adharma, a fact which would seem
to support the interpretation of the terms as sources of dharma in a
restricted context.
A few brief examples will clarify exactly what kinds of standards
we are talking about. In general, the list of 64 anacaras in the LDP
includes rules for bathing, eating, clothing, study, occupation, an-
tyes: t: i funerary rites, ritual, inheritance, and marriage. The first rule
states, for example, ‘‘varjayet dantakas: t:hani [Do not clean your teeth
with sticks].’’ This contradicts the standard rule in Yajñvalkyasmr

ti
and elsewhere to use a twig for cleaning one’s teeth. Another rule
prohibits bathing before sunrise, which conflicts again with rules
found in Yajñavalkya-, Manu-, and Vis:n: u-smr ti, among others. We
also find a rule restricting marriage and, by implication, inheritance
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to the eldest son ‘‘jyes: t:habhrata gr hı bhavet [(only) the eldest son shall
become a householder]’’ – a practice prevalent among Namputiri
Brahmins. There are also rules for non-Brahmins as well. Ks:atriyas,
for instance, are enjoined to follow matrilineal inheritance, called
marumakkattayam in Kerala. Sam: nyasins, we are told, should not
look at women. These short examples demonstrate the brevity of the
rules as well as their diversity.
The list of these rules is introduced as follows (LDhP 12.4.1-2):
athato ’nupravaks:yami nr n: am keral avasinam
anacaran samasena bharggaven: a pradarśitan
anyatracaran: abhavad anacaran bhr gudvahah:
yan acas: t:a catuh: śas: t: im akhyasye tatra tan api
[Now, therefore, I shall declare anacaras for the people who dwell in Kerala as they
have been fully put forth by Bhargava. Among those (previously stated rules), I shall
explain these 64 anacaras as well which the offspring of Bhr

gu has made known
because they are not followed elsewhere.]
The verses make clear that the rules applied only to the ‘‘people who
dwell in Kerala.’’ Twice the rules are called anacara because, as the
text says, ‘‘they are not followed elsewhere’’ and are, therefore, re-
stricted only to people in Kerala. The question then is how do we
make sense of these rules in the context of dharma?
Based on these opening lines, we might be led to think that
everything people did in Kerala was anacara, while what people in
other regions did was acara. In fact, I think this is not the case.
Anacara only refers to this specific list of special rules for people in
Kerala, while acara remains a general term in the LDhP and in
Kerala generally for other standards of conduct approved and ac-
cepted by the Kerala community and, presumably, shared by other
regions as well. Although dharma is not mentioned specifically, I
think it must be understood that both the anacaras and acaras were
dharmas for the people of Kerala, especially considering the frequent
reference to dharma in earlier portions of the LDhP. The nature of
and relationship between the three terms becomes clearer, however,
because of this unusual use of anacara in a positive sense.
Note how the LDhP says that these anacaras were ‘proclaimed by
Bhargava.’ From this, we learn that anacaras and, by inference,
acaras as well were proclaimed or pronounced by people with power
and authority. They were not just random patterns of behavior, but
rather authorized standards of conduct. The link between anacara,
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acara, and dharma was the śis: t:as, the r s: is, the elites who proclaimed
them. The rules for morality, ritual, politics, law, etc. lived in the
persons who held the power to dictate those rules, and these persons
struggled not only with traditional Dharmaśastra texts but also with
regional standards, in this case called anacaras, to determine what
appropriate conduct should be in given circumstances. The tautology
of acara and dharma neatly operates in the LDhP such that even
acaras that explicitly deviate from standards elsewhere are given the
force of dharma because they have been proclaimed by a sage.
The LDhP is a clear case, admittedly unusual, in which it is
explicitly recognized that a specific set of regional standards are more
important than pan-Indian standards, and yet both were dharmas,
albeit with different provenances. In the LDhP, these regional stan-
dards constituted dharma, not vice-versa. Given the understanding
described above of Dharmaśastra as grounded in such standards, the
case of the LDhP may be unusual only in that it explicitly states that
it is based on the standards of a particular region.
There is no conflict between dharma and acara, because each is said
to constitute the other in the circular manner I have described. An-
cara refers to a specific part of one ‘little tradition,’ yet even the
grammatical construction of the term implies the existence of a larger
tradition of acara which in turn provided the building blocks for
dharma and the texts which describe dharma. Historically, the prov-
enance of various acaras was likely restricted to particular places, but,
theologically, acara’s scope was held to be more or less universal if
properly constituted as the sanctioned practices of the ‘good.’ In the
end, in order to understand dharma, we must deconstruct it by
understanding its constituent parts, namely the regional standards of
India. In so doing, we see how the tautological relationship of dharma
and acara produced a thriving religious and legal culture that bal-
anced the elements of tradition and change necessary to any suc-
cessful system of religion and law.
COMMON GLOSSES FOR ACARA IN MEDIEVAL DHARMAŚASTRA
The variety of medieval commentarial glosses on acara17 provides us
with another means of assessing acara’s relationship to dharma. The
range of meanings and synonyms given for acara in these comment-
aries again shows that the authority for this source of dharma rests in
the fact that it was held to be a normative model and a practical
performance of dharma itself. In general, the glosses suggest that
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acara was thought to be something passed down over time, but also
something that had to be accepted conventionally in the current
moment. It was both the recognition of a past tradition and the
creation of a future tradition that emanated from the good character
and learning of those who preserved and proclaimed acara.
Several glosses equate acara with ‘convention,’ including samaya
(convention), agama (tradition), vyavahara (daily business), and lo-
kasam: graha (accepted by the people). The Ujjvala of Haradatta ex-
plains the difficult term samayacarikan in Apastambadharmasutra 1.1
as follows, ‘‘samayamula acarah: samayacarah: tes:u bhavah:
samayacarikah: evam: bhutan dharman iti [standards that are based on
conventions are called conventional standards; something which has
the nature of those (standards) is called conventionally standardized,
and (he is speaking of ) dharmas of that nature]’’ (Joshi, 1988: 60).
The explicit connection of acara with samaya would also link acara
with the important title of law known as the ‘non-observance of
conventions’ (samayanapakarma) in which the authority is given for
various corporate groups to create their own rules and laws which
should be enforced by the king or by the groups’ own power. Samaya
as a gloss clearly imparts a normative significance to acara.
The other glosses of acara as ‘convention’ yield slightly different
nuances to the semantic scope of the term. Agama typically means
what is passed down through a lineage of teachers (param: para) and is
found first as a synonym for acara in Baudhayanadharmasutra 1.1.4
(‘‘tr

tıyah: śis: t: agamah: [the third (source of dharma) is the traditions of
cultured people]’’) in which the expected acara is replace by agama.
The principal medieval commentary on this sutra unambiguously
equates the two with an etymology of the compound term śis: t: agama:
‘‘śis: t:aih: agamyate iti śis: t: agamah: j śis: tacarita ity arthah: [what is han-
ded down by cultured people is the traditions of cultured people; the
meaning is what is observed in practice by cultured people]’’
(Baudhayanavivaran: am, quoted in Joshi, 1988: 52). But acara is not
merely that which is handed down in a traditional manner or through
a specific teaching lineage, but also what is common and accepted in
the present moment. For instance, vyavahara ‘daily business’ as a
gloss is not meant to suggest random activities one might engage in
throughout the day, but rather routinized ways of interacting in
common situations, especially in commerce, that often develop
through contracts and repeated negotiations.18 It connotes stan-
dardized ways of interaction that have developed through frequent
encounters. The gloss lokasam: graha ‘accepted by the people’ most
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pointedly demonstrates that some Dharmaśastra authors (e.g.
Vr

ddhagautama, cited in Joshi, 1988: 50) viewed acara as something
deriving directly from a collective consent of the populace. In this
context, one is also reminded of the antonyms lokavidvis: t:a and lok-
avikrus: t:a ‘despised by the people’ which describe instances in which
dharma is set aside because it contravenes the conventions of the
people. The precise limits and nature of such collective consent or
dissent are not well explicated, but the general impulse is clearly to
mark as dharma those standards of conduct that were current among
at least some significant portion of the populace.
The other class of glosses for acara frame acara as an embodiment
of or performance of dharma, including śıla and anus: t:hana. These
glosses view acara as something that one follows based on both in-
nate and learned dispositions of personal character. Śıla, for example,
connotes the composite habits, propensities, and perspectives that
one has developed genetically and, possibly, through education, and,
therefore, may be understood as ‘character’ in general sense. In
glossing Gautamadharmasutra (GDh) 1.2 (tadvidam: ca smr tiśile [as
well as the traditions and character of those who know them, i.e. the
Vedas]), the commentator Maskarin states, ‘‘acaratmatus: t:ı api śila
evantarbhute iti na pr

thag upanyaste [standards of conduct and what
is pleasing to oneself are both part of character and, thus, are not
separately mentioned]’’ (Joshi, 1988: 43). In this conception, śila as a
gloss for acara suggests that the latter is a kind of internal embodi-
ment of the Vedic corpus (śruti) and its traditions (smr

ti). In addition,
acara as character is most likely the underlying form for the deriva-
tive term acarya, or teacher, ‘‘one who possesses good character.’’19
By far the most common gloss for acara in all of medieval Dhar-
maśastra is anus: t:hana, and I will end this discussion of the glosses for
acara by investigating the meaning of this term, especially in relation
to dharma. The closest English equivalent for anus: t:hana is probably
‘performance,’ because it connotes both an activity and a model on
which that activity is based. Etymologically, anus: t:hana is a nominal
form derived from the verb root stha ‘‘to stand, to be fixed on, etc.
‘with the verbal prefix anu’ along, after, with, etc.’’ The presence of
the prefix anu suggests more than mere practice, but rather a per-
formance or practice ‘in accordance’ with some rule or standard. The
implicit standard here must be śruti and smr

ti to which all acara is
related and with which all acara is said to conform (see, e.g. GDh
11.20-1). Anus: t:hana is generally more particular in meaning than
acara in that it refers to the proper performance of a previously
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enjoined action and not to rule-bound actions in general that carry
normative weight. It is, therefore, the particular performance of
dharma in a practical context. Acara, by contrast, refers to the whole
collection of such standardized practices that conform to the śruti
and smr: ti and that supplement the injunctions of these sources of
dharma. Anus: t:hana as a gloss imparts to acara a sense that it is
something one must learn because it is based upon prior paradigms of
conduct that have normative significance.
These two groups of synonymous/explanatory terms show the
conceptualization of acara as practiced dharma. The issue of dharma’s
authority seems inextricably related to the question of dharma’s
practicability. If dharma is not put into practice or cannot be, then the
question of its authority is moot. On the other hand, if acara repre-
sents the putting of dharma into practice, as I have argued, then
dharma’s authority rests in great measure on the dissemination and
understanding of acara. Ultimately, all acara is dharma and, in fact,
constitutes the practical embodiment and performance of dharma.
CONCLUSIONS
In his introduction to the critical edition of the Manavadharmaśastra
(forthcoming), Patrick Olivelle argues that Dharmaśastra texts, like
all śastras, ‘‘represent a meta-discourse; they deal with reality but
always once removed . . . Śastras exercised control over practice not
directly but through the mediation of experts.’’ Olivelle’s character-
ization is most appropriate and persuasive, but it also begs the
question of what the primary discourse of dharma was in medieval
India. If Dharmaśastra is a ‘meta-discourse’ that derives its content
from acara, then it would follow that acara must be the primary
discourse, i.e. dharma in practice. Dharmaśastra texts contemplate
and systematize acara without replacing the ongoing value of extra-
śastric acara to the evolving practical, day-to-day negotiations over
the proper course of dharma.
The manner of textual expression used in Dharmaśastra – a
timeless, unchanging, injunctive idiom – often makes it difficult to
trace developments of thought about dharma or other topics. The
connection of dharma with acara was certainly not new to the
medieval texts. However, acara’s significance as a source of dharma
does appear to grow over time within the Dharmaśastra corpus
(Kane, 1946: 869–879; Altekar, 1952: 43). We find greater elaboration
and detail about the nature of acara; we find acara being linked with
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related terms such as caritra and maryada used in other historical
sources to refer to local laws and standards (see Davis, 1999, 2002);
and we also find a growing number of sources that suggest the true
supremacy of acara over smr

ti or even dharma itself, especially in
judicial contexts.
For instance, in the medieval Balakrıd: a commentary, Viśvarupa
states, ‘‘yathaivaryavartanivasiśis: t:avyavaharasthitis tathaiva smr tyartho
’nusartavyo na tadviparyayen: a [The meaning of smr ti should be
understood so as to conform with the established standards of those
who dwell in Aryavarta and not the other way around]’’ (Ganapati
Sastri, 1921–1922). In this case, I would argue that the term vya-
vaharasthiti should be understood as a synonym for acara. Viśvarupa
modifies the absolute precedence accorded to smr

ti by declaring acara
to be an interpretive matrix within which smr

ti must be understood
and applied.
Even dharma gives way to acara in certain contexts as attested in
the Katyayanasmr

ti, cited in the medieval Smr

ticandrika and
Paraśaramadhavıya: ‘‘yad yad acaryate yena dharmyam: vadharmyam
eva va j deśasyacaran: an nityam: caritram: tad prakırtitam [Whatever is
practiced (as a rule), whether it conforms to dharma or not, is called
caritra because it has been perpetually observed (as an authoritative
practice) in the locality]’’ (Joshi, 1937: 103).20 Again, I would argue
that caritra in this verse is synonymous with acara, though the former
seems to be found generally in discussions of judicial procedure in
Dharmaśastra texts (Lingat, 1962). The text here, as Kane points out,
‘‘is principally concerned with the decision of legal disputes on the
basis of the customs of countries and families, but his rules also have
a general application’’ (1946: 862). In other words, the context is a
legal dispute and not a general consideration of dharma, but this
passage nevertheless inverts the basic hierarchy of the sources of
dharma in the special context of judicial procedures (vyavahara) – a
move that pushes dharma, and implicitly śruti and smr

ti as well, to a
subordinate position in this important practical context. It is unlikely
that the text intends to subvert the primacy of the Vedas and śastras
as the principal sources of dharma, but the inversion is intriguing as a
possible circumscription of the power of these texts in favor of
acara.21 Overall, therefore, acara’s significance as a source of dharma
and as a source of law and legal procedure in its own right expands in
medieval texts.
On the basis of this expanded importance of acara, the main
purpose of this essay has been to argue that acara and its rela-
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tionship to dharma cannot be fully understood if relegated to the
unhelpful category of ‘custom.’ The idea that acara lacks specific
content and corresponds to the vague notions of ‘custom’ that float
around legal theory circles must be reconsidered in the light of the
precise manner of expression and the clearly defined content of
acara as it is discussed in the texts. In this way, acara constitutes
perhaps the most significant source of dharma in medieval Dhar-
maśastra. At the same time, the authority of acara itself derives in a
tautological manner from the authority accorded to knowledgeable
(śis: t:a) and good (sat) people whose character is made impeccable
and trustworthy by virtue of their Vedic study and education in the
śastras. The productive tautology described here lent both stability
and adaptability to the religio-legal thought and institutions of
medieval India. It would thus be perilous to understand dharma and
its authority without at the same time seeing its intimate connection
to acara.
NOTES
1 A convenient summary of such acceptance by scholars such as Kane, Sen Gupta,
Lingat, Derrett, Lariviere can be found in Wezler, 1999: 74 (also included in the
present volume).
2 For a similar assertion, less well articulated, see Mandlik 1880 [1982]: ‘‘The next
source of Dharmaśastra which I have now to consider is that of usage or custom. In
regard to this branch of law, I am inclined to hold that this has always been the main
source of the Aryan law from the earliest times; and that our Smr: tis and Puran: as, so
far as they relate to Dharmaśastra, have been merely the records of customs that
existed in those days’’ (xliii).
3 The ambiguities in Wezler’s original German version parallel, but not do not
precisely coincide, with those in the English version (included in the present volume).
The distinctions between Sitte, Brauch, Wandel, Verhalten, and ‘Praxis’, all used by
Wezler, do not ameliorate the contradictions entailed in describing custom as both
norm and behavior. In my view, acara is closest to Brauch and ‘Praxis’ as used by
Wezler because both of these terms carry normative weight.
4 Blackstone (1765–1769[1979]), following Hale (1713[2002]), elaborates his defini-
tion of ‘customs’ as unwritten laws that have been gradually codified in written form
(I, 63–64) in a way that suggests that their authority and ‘binding power’ is not
exclusively derived from ill-defined ‘long usage’ and ‘universal reception.’ He writes:
But here a very natural, and very material, question arises: how are these customs or
maxims too be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined ? The answer
is, by the judges in the several courts of justice. They are the depositary of the laws;
the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an
oath to decide according to the law of the land. (I, 69)
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One should also mention for this period the influential notion of custom in David
Hume’s work, notably An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in which he
claims that custom, in the sense of repeated experience, is at the root of all knowledge
and is the very basis of epistemology as a whole (1748 [1999]: 121–122), a radically
different idea of custom as part of individual, not collective experience.
5 The most comprehensive review is found in the collected articles in Renteln and
Dundes, 1994. See also Dickenson, 1929; Simpson, 1973; Pospisil, 1974; Geertz,
1983; Watson, 1984; Moore, 1986; Correas, 1994; Glenn, 1997.
6 Here I am specifically disagreeing with Wezler (present volume, f.n. 40) where he
declares, ‘‘Hacker states that rendering dharma as ‘norm,’ ‘law,’ or ‘obligation’ was
‘far too abstract.’ The same is true for acara.’’
7 See also Kumarila’s Tantravarttika (Jha, 1983: 184), and Haradatta’s commentary
on Apastambadharmasutra 1.1.1: ‘‘na hi brumah: samayamatram: praman: am iti j kim:
tarhi j dharmajña ye manvadayas tes: am: samayah: praman: am: dharmadharmayoh: [We
are not saying that just any convention is a means of knowing (dharma). What is
then? The conventions of those who know dharma such as Manu and others are the
means of knowing dharma and adharma]’’ (Joshi, 1988: 60).
8 Wezler states, ‘‘we can differentiate acara before its realization – the authoritative,
ideal model of behavior –, and acara in its actual and practical realization. Good
conduct is thus realization of custom – in Gonda’s sense – and this conduct, the
recollected tradition, is itself again a model and example for others’’ (1999: 84–85).
This would seem to contradict his own footnote to this passage (cited above in f.n. 6)
which empties acara of any normative content on the grounds of over-abstraction.
With my reservations about the term ‘custom’ aside, my argument broadly agrees
with his main text, but not with his footnote.
9 Classic examples of such spatial and temporal variability of dharma/acara include
Madhava’s defense of cross-cousin marriage in South India, the Baudhayanasutra’s
list of five authorized regional practices (1.2.1-6), the kalivarjyas, and apaddharma.
From the perspective of Mmam: sa, i.e. from a theological point of view, all true
acara has universal applicability and authority and cannot legitimately have
authority in one geographic area and not another (Jha, 1916: 84). Medieval Dhar-
maśastra seems more ambiguous about the potential variability of acara, although it,
too, emphasizes the consonance of Vedic injunctions and acara rules.
10 On the intimate connection between Dharmaśastra and Mmam: sa, see Kane,
1962: 5, 1152ff. and Sarkar, 1909.
11 The same passage also records the following opinion, ‘‘tasam: smr tınam:
nyayamulakatve ’pi nyayasya vedamulakatvat tatsmr

tınam api vedatulyatvam iti kecit
[Even though the these sm: rtis are rooted in reason, because reason is rooted in the
Vedas, even the smr

tis (of the Vedas) are said to be equal to the Vedas].’’
12 See Jha, 1916: 79ff. for the full explanation of the famous Holakadhikaran: a on the
general authority of local ‘customs’ (acara). See alsoTantravarttika (Jha, 1983: 244ff.).
13 Medhatithi on Manu 2.10 (Jha, 1920–1939: Vol. 1: 70): ‘‘śis: t:asamacarad api
dharmasya kartavyatavagatih: j so ’pi smr tir eva j tataś ca yatra kasmai cit karyaya
smr

ter upadanam: tatra sadacaro ’pi grahıtavyah: [The understanding of the necessary
duties of dharma arises from the collective standards of cultured people. Thus, these,
too, are called smr

ti (codified tradition). As a result, in whatever context and in
whichever matter smr

ti is mentioned, there the acara of good people also should be
understood]’’ (my translation).
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14 See Tantravarttika (Jha, 1983: 111ff.).
15 The traditional boundaries of Kerala are not significantly different from the
borders of the modern state by the same name. The Keral






a land as the area from Gokarn: am(near modern Mangalore)
to Kanyakumar at the southern tip of India, bounded by the Western Ghats
throughout.
16 Although these two texts are not Dharmaśastra texts, their use of the term
duracara resembles that in LDhP and, therefore, provides an instructive point of
comparison. See also Deshpande, 1993 for further remarks on the linguistic features
of the Sanskrit in the Gırvan: apadamañjarı and Gırvan: ava _nmañjarı.
17 The discussion below is based on a review of the collected commentaries con-
tained in the well-known encyclopedia of Dharmaśastra texts, the Dharmakośa in the
Varn: aśramadharmakan: d: a (Joshi, 1988), specifically the section on dharmap-
raman: avicara. This excellent compendium provides a convenient synoptic overview
of the Dharmaśastra debates and arguments concerning the sources of dharma,
including acara. A thorough review in English of the relationship of ‘‘custom and
Dharmaśastra works’’ can be found in Kane, 1946: 3, 856–884.
18 See Medhatithi’s Manubhas:ya on Manavadharmaśastra 2.6 quoted in Joshi, 1988:
98.
19 The opposite derivation is also possible, but in either case, the connection of the
two terms seems indisputable.
20 For a similar verse, see Pitamaha cited in Joshi, 1937: 105. See also the discussion
in Lingat, 1973: 176ff.
21 In this regard, one should also mention rajaśasana, the edict of the king, also
listed in the context of judicial procedures as higher than even acara. See Narad-
asmr

ti 1.10 ‘‘The four feet of legal procedure are dharma, legal procedure, custom,
and the king’s decree; each latter one overrules the former’’ (Lariviere, 1989). These
four ‘feet’ (pada) should be understood as modes of judicial proof and decision-
making.
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Correas, Ó. (1994). La teorı́a general del derecho frente al derecho indı́gena. Crı́tica
Juridica 14, 15–31.
Davis, Jr. D.R. (1999). Recovering the indigenous legal traditions of India: classical
Hindu law in practice in late medieval Kerala. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27(3),
159–213.
Davis, Jr. D.R. (2002). Dharma,Maryada, and law in early British Malabar: remarks
on words for ‘law’ in the Tellicherry records. Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 23,
51–70.
DONALD R. DAVIS, JR.828
Derrett, J.D.M. (1977). The development of the concept of property in India c. A.D.
800–1800. Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law. Vol. 2. Leiden: Brill. [orig.
pub. 1962].
Deshpande, M.M. (1993). Sanskrit and Prakrit: Sociolinguistic Issues. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Dickinson, J. (1929). The law behind the law. 29 Columbia Law Review 113–146,
285–319.
Ganapati Sastri, T. (ed.) (1921–1922 [1982]). The Yajñavalkyasmr
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Pat:ha-Śala-Man: d: ala.
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